We study majority voting over a bidimensional policy space when the voters' type space is either uni-or bidimensional. We show that a Condorcet winner fails to generically exist even with a unidimensional type space. We then study two voting procedures widely used in the literature. The Stackelberg (ST) procedure assumes that votes are taken one dimension at a time according to an exogenously speci ed sequence. The Kramer-Shepsle (KS) procedure also assumes that votes are taken separately on each dimension, but not in a sequential way. A vector of policies is a Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium if each component coincides with the majority choice on this dimension given the other components of the vector.
Introduction
It is well known that majority voting su ers from what Bernheim and Slavov (2009) call the \curse of multidimensionality": when the policy space is su ciently rich, there is no policy option that gathers a majority of votes when faced with all other possible options {i.e., there is no Condorcet winner (see e.g. Plott 1967 , Davis, DeGroot and Hinich 1972 , McKelvey, Ordeshook and Ungar 1980 , Banks, Duggan and Le Breton 2006 and Banks and Austen-Smith 1999 .
To the best of our knowledge, all rigorous formal versions of this result assume that the space of voters' types is multidimensional, with a probability distribution of voters' types whose support is multidimensional as well. Also, the respective roles of the properties of the types' distribution function and of utility functions are not clearly disentangled. For instance, in the spatial model of politics (where preferences are Euclidean), the symmetry of preferences is imposed and the focus is exclusively on the distribution of voters' types. The rst objective of this paper is to ll this gap and to study the existence of a Condorcet winner with a unidimensional type space.
Faced with this \curse of multidimensionality", the applied political economy literature has adopted several approaches, including the obvious one of restricting the policy space to be unidimensional. In this paper, we adopt a bidimensional policy space and we focus on two widely used approaches having in common that votes never take place simultaneously on all dimensions.
The rst approach assumes that citizens vote sequentially on each dimension. An exogenous ordering of the dimensions is considered and, at each voting stage, the outcomes of the preceding votes are known to the voters. For instance, when there are two dimensions, a rst majority vote is organized on one of the policy dimensions and is followed by a second majority vote on the other dimension. We call Stackelberg (ST) equilibria the policies that can be supported at equilibrium for a particular ordering of the dimensions. This sequential resolution has been used by many authors in political economy models (see e.g. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999 , Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby 2004 , Cremer, De Donder and Gahvari 2004 , Cremer et al. 2007 , De Donder, Le Breton and Peluso 2009 , Etro 2006 , Gregorini 2009 , Haimanko, Le Breton and Weber 2005 .
The second approach assumes instead that there is no sequential ordering of the votes, but that they are taken separately on each dimension. Under the presumption that all dimensions except one have been settled, citizens cast their vote on the residual dimension. A solution is consistent if the vector of policies obtained through that procedure is self-supporting in a Nash-like manner. This idea has been independently developed by Kramer (1972) and Shepsle (1979) and hereafter we will call Kramer-Shepsle's equilibria (KS) the policy vectors meeting this consistency condition. More precisely, a vector is a Kramer-Shepsle's equilibrium if, for any dimension, the corresponding component in the vector coincides with the majority choice on this dimension given the other components of the policy vector. This concept has also been studied by the applied political economy literature, e.g. by De Donder and Hindriks (1998) , Diba and Feldman (1984) , Nechyba (1997) , Sadanand and Williamson (1991) . On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, the only theoretical contributions are two unpublished papers by Banks and Duggan (2004) and Duggan (2001) .
In this paper, we provide an analysis of the KS and ST equilibria in a general framework with a bidimensional policy space. We study their existence, uniqueness and we compare them, looking e.g. at the impact of the ordering of votes for ST and identifying circumstances under which ST and KS equilibria coincide. In the process, we state explicitly the assumptions on the utility function that are needed for these equilibria to be well-behaved. We especially stress the importance of single-crossing conditions, and we identify two variants of these assumptions: a \marginal" version that is imposed on all policy dimensions separately, and a \joint" version whose de nition involves both policy dimensions. We perform this analysis rst with a unidimensional type space, and then with a bidimensional type space.
Our results run as follows. Starting with a unidimensional type space, we show that the \curse of multidimensionality" (of the policy space) applies in this case as well: even when we assume that the utility function satis es both marginal and joint single-crossing, there is generically no Condorcet winner and, perhaps more surprisingly, in most cases and for any policy proposal, it is possible to nd a direction that is favored by quasi all voters. We then study the KS and ST equilibria in this setting. We show that marginal single crossing guarantees the existence and unicity of the KS solution, and that assuming also strategic complementarity between policy dimensions results in the KS equilibrium to coincide with the unique ST equilibrium (independently of the ordering of votes). We then study a speci c environment that has received a lot of attention in di erent literatures (e.g. on nation formation) and which does not satisfy the marginal single-crossing property. We show that the ST equilibrium studied in the literature corresponds to the KS equilibrium, but that the ST equilibrium with the opposite sequence of votes (which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been studied previously) is more complex, with the identity of the second-stage decisive voter being a ected by the rst-stage voting decision. We provide a thorough analysis of how rst-stage voting is impacted in that case (i.e., how voters bias their rst-stage voting choices when anticipating the impact on the second-stage decisive voter's identity).
We then move to a bidimensional type space. We do not study the existence of a simultaneous Condorcet winner in this setting since, in contrast to the one-dimensional types' space case, this analysis would be very similar to what has already been done in theoretical political science Austen-Smith 1999, Ordeshook 1986 ). Instead, we focus on the analysis of the sets of Kramer-Shepsle and Stackelberg equilibria. We show that marginal single-crossing ensures the existence of KS equilibria, but not their uniqueness. We then move to the well known spatial framework, which is often used in the political science literature, and we show that KS and ST equilibria are unique and coincide when individuals di er in the (bidimensional) location of their most-preferred policy but share the same shape of their indi erence curves. We provide an example with a discrete number of types di ering both in the location and in the shape of their indi erence curves and where i) there are multiple KS equilibria, ii) not all KS equilibria correspond to ST equilibria (whatever the ordering of the votes) and iii) some KS equilibria do not correspond to any voter's most-preferred policy.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the one-dimensional type general framework. Its rst subsection analyzes simultaneous voting, the second subsection studies and compares Kramer-Shepsle and Stackelberg equilibria, while the third subsection is devoted to the analysis of a speci c environment studied e.g. in the nation formation literature. Section 3 focuses on the case with two-dimensional types. General results about ST and KS equilibria are reported in section 3.1., while section 3.2. analyzes the standard set up of spatial voting with quadratic preferences. Section 4 concludes. Most proofs are relegated to Appendices.
One-Dimensional Types
Throughout the paper, we consider a population of voters who have to select a public policy in a two-dimensional policy space. A policy choice is therefore a vector (x; y) 2 X; where the set of feasible policy choices X is assumed to be a rectangular subset of < 2 .
1 In this section, we assume that each voter is described by a one-dimensional type 2 <. The statistical distribution of types is given by a continuous cumulative distribution function F whose support is an interval
[ ; ] of <, with f the corresponding density. The utility of a citizen of type for policy (x; y)
is denoted by V ( ; x; y) that is assumed to be twice continuously di erentiable and concave in x and y. The following examples illustrate the broad spectrum of applications covered by this framework.
Example 1 (Absolute Intensity of the Preference for Public Goods) Let X = < 2 + and V ( ; x; y) = U (x; y) (x+y) where U is a twice continuously di erentiable, increasing and concave function of x and y. In this setting, x and y denote the quantities of two di erent pure public goods produced under constant returns to scale and nanced through per capita taxation. The parameter re ects the intensity of the preference for the bundle (x; y) of public goods (aggregated through U ) with respect to the private numeraire.
Example 2 (Proportional IncomeTaxation)
Let X = < 2 + and V ( ; x; y) = U (x; y) (x+y) where U is a twice continuously di erentiable, increasing and concave function of x and y and = R f ( )d . In this setting, x and y denote, once again, the quantities of two di erent pure public goods produced under constant returns to scale. The parameter denotes the income of a citizen. Under that interpretation, V is simply the indirect utility of a citizen with income when the contribution to the nancing of the public good is proportional to income. interpretation is the same as in Example 1 with preferences for public goods assumed to be Cobb-Douglas. However, the parameter now plays two roles: it describes both the absolute intensity of the preference for both public goods and it also determines the marginal rate of substitution between the two public goods.
Example 4 (Spatial Politics with Di erentiated weights) Let X = < 2 and V ( ; x; y) = ( )(x ) 2 ( )(y ) 2 where and are two positive continuously di erentiable functions. In this general framework, the parameter plays two roles. On one hand, it describes the favorite policy bundle of a citizen regardless of the speci c features of and . However, on the other hand, it also determines through these functions the respective weights placed by a citizen of the two dimensions. In the particular case where
, we obtain the spatial model of politics with the extra assumption that the support of the distribution is one dimensional (precisely the diagonal). x denotes the quantity of a pure public good while y now denotes a horizontal characteristic of this public good. This policy environment has been analyzed by many authors, including Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) , Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004) , Perroni and Scharf (2001) in the analysis of local jurisdictions, and Etro (2006) and Gregorini (2009) in the exploration of models of nation formation. It is also reminiscent of the voting environment of Groseclose (2007) where the horizontal dimension denotes ideology while the other dimension represents valence (de ned as an advantage that a candidate has due to a non-policy factor, such as incumbency or charisma). All voters have the same preference on the valence dimension (hence the term \one-and-a-half dimensional" used by Groseclose, 2007) .
We rst study the simultaneous voting game over the two dimensions before turning to sequential voting and the Kramer-Shepsle solution.
Simultaneous Voting
We now show that in the context of simultaneous voting over a bidimensional policy space with unidimensional voters' types, the fact that utility functions satisfy reasonable \single-crossing" conditions does not guarantee the existence of a Condorcet winner. On the contrary, for any policy proposal, it is always possible to propose an alternative policy that is favored by quasi all voters. Throughout the paper, we assume the following monotonicity property:
Assumption 1 (Marginal Single-Crossing) We assume that
for all (x; y) 2 X and 2 <.
Assumption 1 simply states that the marginal utility of both dimensions increases monotonically with the type of the agent. This monotonicity assumption implies that the classical singlecrossing condition (which states that \leftist voters tend to favor left policies more than voters who are rightist in political preferences" (Myerson, 1996, p.23) ) is satis ed on each dimension separately, hence the term of marginal single-crossing assumption.
It is easy to see that Assumption 1 is satis ed in Examples 1 and 2, 2 and also in Example 3 if x and y are large enough. As for Example 4, we obtain
The rst term is always positive while the second term can take negative values. It is enough to bound the second term. Since jx j is always less than 1, Assumption 1 holds as soon as 0 ( ) is not too large. If we denote by m the minimum of ( ) over [ ; ] , then it will hold whenever j 0 ( )j < m. The same analysis applies to
Assumption 1 does not hold for Example 5. We obtain We denote by x(y; ) (respectively, y(x; )) individual 's most-preferred value of x (resp., of y) for any given y (resp., given x). The following lemma (proved in Appendix 1) shows that concavity of the utility function together with Assumption 1 guarantee that i) the mostpreferred value of x (respectively, of y) is increasing in , for any given y (resp., given x) and ii) the individual with the median type med is decisive in both choices if they are taken separately.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, i) the most-preferred value of x (respectively, of y) is increasing in , for any given y (resp., given x): @x (y; ) @ 0 and @y (x; ) @ 0;
ii) there exists a majority voting equilibrium when voting over x for any given y (resp., over y for any given x){i.e., a value of x such that there is no x 0 6 = x that is favored by more than one half of the voters to x (and similarly for y) . This equilibrium (called the one-dimensional
Condorcet winner), which we denote by x m (y) (resp., y m (x)), corresponds to the value of x 2 Up to a change of sign in Example 2. This change of sign is innocuous here, as all our results in this section hold mutatis mutandis when marginal rates of substitution are monotonically decreasing in .
(resp., of y) that is most-preferred by the individual with the median type, med :
x m (y) = x(y; med ) 8y 2 <;
The following proposition (proved in Appendix 2) shows that, if a Condorcet winner exists when voting simultaneously over the two dimensions, then it must be the most-preferred policy bundle of the individual with the median type, med :
Proposition 1 In the bidimensional majority voting setting with a unidimensional type space, under Assumption 1, the majority equilibrium (x ; y ) under simultaneous voting over both dimensions, if it exists, must be the unique ideal point of the median type voter med :
x = x(y ; med ) and y = y(x ; med ):
We now investigate under which conditions a vector (x s ; y s ) (called the status quo hereafter)
is preferred by a majority of voters to any local deviation. We establish the conditions under which an individual votes in favor of a motion moving away from the status quo in a (arbitrary)
The change in the utility of a voter of type induced by d is
The population of voters who favor a move from the status quo in the direction d is composed of all the types for which '( ) > 0: In particular we focus on the local Condorcet winner, de ned as a policy pair (x ; y ) such that for any vector (d x ; d y ) 2 < 2 and any " > 0, the mass of citizens who strictly prefer (x + "d x ; y + "d y ) to (x ; y ) is less than or at most equal to
To test whether the policy pair (x ; y ) de ned in Proposition 1 is a local Condorcet winner, we introduce the function
dF;
3 The function ' also depends on d and on the status quo, but we simplify the notation by writing '( ):
which measures the proportion of voters favoring a deviation in direction d from the status quo (x ; y ).
Observe that ' 0 ( ) the (absolute value of) 4 the marginal rate of substitution between x and y at (x ; y ) for individual , we obtain that voters who favor the direction d are such that > med together with M RS( ) > d x =d y (i.e., those for whom the utility gain from a larger value of x is bigger than the utility loss from the lower value of y); or such that < med together with M RS( ) < d x =d y (i.e., those for whom the utility gain from a smaller value of y is bigger 4 Note that, under Assumption 1, the marginal rate of substitution at (x ; y ) is negative for all individuals since @V ( ; x ; y )=@x > 0 and @V ( ; x ; y )=@y > 0 for all > med while @V ( ; x ; y )=@x < 0 and @V ( ; x ; y )=@y < 0 for all < med : Slightly abusing notation, we denote by MRS( med ) the limit, as tends towards med , of MRS( ).
than the utility loss from the larger value of x). The identi cation of the coalition of citizens (d x ; d y ) supporting the deviation is illustrated on Figure 1 below, where we represent the MRS measured at (x ; y ) as a function of . It is important to note that this coalition need not be connected.
5
Insert Figure with respect to F for the policy (x ; y ) to be a local Condorcet winner. This may happen for some speci c value of d x =d y but then a small perturbation of d x =d y is likely to destroy this property.
6
We then impose further structure on the problem in the hope of nding circumstances under which a local Condorcet winner exists. An interesting benchmark, often used in the political economy literature, is the case where the utility function exhibits the single-crossing or SpenceMirrlees's condition (Gans and Smart 1996, Rothstein 1990) {i.e., where the marginal rate of substitution is monotone 7 in :
Assumption 2 (Joint Single-crossing) We assume that @V ( ; x; y)=@x @V ( ; x; y)=@y is increasing in for all (x; y) 2 X and 2 <.
5 If we consider for instance the speci c frameworks of Examples 3 and 4 for the bundle (x ; y ) = ( med ; y med ), we obtain that M RS( ) = ( ) ( ) . This function can display any sort of chaotic behavior for convenient selection of the functions and .
6 This reasoning does not hold when M RS ( ) is constant since, for any given directional deviation, the society is always divided equally. We provide an example of such a case after Proposition 2 below. 7 The subsequent analysis would carry through to the case where the MRS is monotone decreasing in type.
Note that there is no logical connection between the two single-crossing conditions that we study (Assumptions 1 and 2) in the sense that neither implies nor precludes the other.
We then obtain the following result. While the reader may not be surprised by part a) of Proposition 2, part b) is more surprising, since in that case there is a unanimity against the median voter's most-preferred policy, even under marginal and joint single crossing conditions. The fact that single crossing is not conducive to the existence of an equilibrium can be shown when studying one family of preferences (not satisfying Assumption 2) where we can guarantee the existence of a Condorcet winner, whatever the distribution function F . Assume that the function V is symmetrical with respect to the variables x and y : V ( ; x; y) = V ( ; y; x) for all ; x and y in <:
In that case, x = y and MRS( ) = 1 for all 6 = med . This means that individuals with
with jd y j < jd x j, and oppose all other deviations. Likewise, individuals with < med favor all
and oppose all other deviations. We then obtain that (d) = 1=2 for all d, so that (x ; y ) is a Condorcet winner whatever the distribution F of types. The intuition for this result is that assuming a perfectly symmetrical utility function brings us back essentially to the realm of one-dimensional policies, where the classical median voter theorem applies.
The take home message of this section is then that, except in very peculiar circumstances such as a perfectly symmetrical utility function, there is little hope of nding a Condorcet winner when voting simultaneously over the two dimensions, even when the type space is unidimensional and single crossing conditions are satis ed.
We now move to the other equilibrium concepts studied in this paper, those proposed by
Kramer and Shepsle, and by Stackelberg.
Kramer-Shepsle and Stackelberg equilibria
Let us examine rst the Kramer-Shepsle equilibria.
De nition 1 A Kramer-Shepsle (or KS) equilibrium is a policy vector (x KS ; y KS ) such that Let us now move to the set of Stackelberg (or ST) equilibria that arise when there is a sequence of two votes. We assume (without loss of generality at this stage) that individuals are rst called to vote over x and then, after having observed the voting outcome of this rst round, that they vote over y. We solve for these ST equilibria and compare them with both the SK equilibrium and with the ST equilibria under the opposite sequence (where voters choose rst y and then x).
Solving backward, we know from Lemma 1 that, for any outcome x in the rst stage, the majority voting equilibrium in the second stage is the most-preferred value of y of the median type med , so that
This implies that, in the rst stage, the reduced utility of a citizen of type for x is equal to
8 Since X has been assumed to be rectangular, this implies that the projections of X on the two axis are intervals.
De nition 2 A Stackelberg (or ST) equilibrium when voters choose rst x and then y is a
Of course, the rst part of the de nition of ST is not easy to test in general. Under the presumption that the function U ( ; x) is concave in x for all , 9 the rst-order condition describing the optimal rst-stage choice of a citizen of type is given by
and satis es
The rst term of (2) describes the direct e ect of varying x on the individual's utility, while the second term describes the indirect e ect through variations in the second-stage voting outcome.
To be able to sign this derivative, we will make an extensive use of the following assumption:
Assumption 3 (Strategic complementarity) We assume that the two policy dimensions are strategic complements:
From this assumption, we deduce the following lemma.
Lemma 2 With strategic complements, we have both (a) dy m (x) =dx 0 and (b) dx m (y) =dy
0:
9 The rst part of Appendix 6 studies the concavity of U ( ; x).
Proof. The proof of (a) comes from the concavity of V ( ; x; y) in y together with
The proof of (b) is obtained similarly.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (2), we get
Since, from the second-order condition, the denominator of this ratio is negative, we deduce from Assumption 1 and Lemma 2(a) that
0. Recall that Assumption 1 states that the marginal utility obtained from both dimensions x and y increases with . Coupled with strategic complementarity of x and y, we then obtain that the most-preferred rst-period value of x increases with (since a larger type reaps a larger direct bene t from an increase in x and also bene ts more from the increase in the equilibrium value of y that a larger x generates).
Since we have assumed that U ( ; x) is concave in x for all , we can apply the median voter theorem and we obtain from the monotonicity
0 that the majority equilibrium is x F ( med ). But from (2), we know that
Since we have also showed that
we deduce that
In words, the median voter anticipates in the rst stage that he will remain decisive in the second stage as well. In his rst-stage choice of x, he then ignores (by an envelope theorem argument) the indirect e ect of x on his utility, and chooses the optimal value of x given the value of y that will result in the second stage. The resulting policy bundle
constitutes the unique Stackelberg equilibrium. Moreover, comparing equations (1), (5) and (6) shows that this policy pair is the same as the Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium. We can state the following:
Proposition 4 In the bidimensional majority voting setting with a unidimensional type space, under Assumptions 1 (marginal single crossing) and 3 (strategic complementarity) and assuming that the function U ( ; x) is concave in x for all , the unique Stackelberg equilibrium where people vote rst over x and then over y coincides with the ideal two-dimensional policy of the median citizen med , and with the Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium. The same equilibrium also emerges with the opposite sequence of vote (provided that the reduced rst-period utility function is concave in y).
So, if both dimensions are strategic complements, the order of the vote does not matter and the ST equilibrium is moreover identical to the KS equilibrium. If both dimensions are not strategic complements, then the most-preferred rst-stage value of x need not be monotone in . In that case, it is necessary to consider the decreasing rearrangement e x of x. Then the median outcome x med is the solution to the equation
and in general x med 6 = x ( med ). Also, in that case, the order of the votes matters, since the ST equilibrium will typically di er according to whether people vote rst over x or over y.
To go beyond these generalities, we need to put more structure on the utility function. In the next section, we concentrate on a family of utility functions that has been studied at length, for instance in the nation formation literature.
One-sided Separability
In this subsection, we focus on the environment described in Example 5, which has received a great deal of attention in di erent elds. This setting is characterized by both a horizontal and a vertical dimension. As already pointed out, Assumption 1 (marginal single crossing) is not satis ed so that this setting calls for a separate tailored treatment.
Let us assume that 2 [0; 1] and V ( ; x; y) = v(x) (y ) x where x 2 < + and y 2 [0; 1] :
We assume that v is increasing and concave, and that is a function with values in < ++ , symmetrical with respect to 0 and increasing to the left of 0. 10 We also assume that the function is di erentiable everywhere, so that 0 (0) = 0. 11 This general form describes the situation of a public policy program with a vertical dimension x (the quantity or quality level of a public good) and a horizontal dimension y (a characteristic of the public good, such as its color, location,...). The type of a voter represents her most-preferred public good variant y among all feasible options : any departure from this ideal choice decreases her utility for any value of x. Also, for any xed type of public good y, each voter derives a gross bene t from this public good consumption which increases with x. We assume that the unit cost of production of the public good is one, that there is a mass one of consumers, and that public provision is nanced with a lump sum tax. We thus have to subtract x from the gross utility to obtain the net utility of the public good. Note that the function V (:) is concave in x but not necessarily in y, as we make no concavity assumption on the function (:).
We start by looking at the ST procedure where citizens vote rst over x and then over y. This is the sequence the jurisdiction and nation formation literatures have focused on. Note rst that the majority choice over y does not depend upon x, while the converse is not true, as an individual's willingness to pay for the public good depends on its location. We dub this property one-sided separability. Whatever the value of x, the majority choice over y, which we denote by y med ; is given by y m (x) = y(x; med ) = y med = med :
10 Therefore, it is decreasing to the right of 0. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), Etro (2006) and Gregorini (2009) consider the speci c case where (y; ) = j yj where is a parameter larger than 1. 11 This di erentiability assumption is not necessary for our arguments but allows to signi cantly simplify some proofs.
Given y med , the reduced utility function takes the form
Given our assumptions on v and , U is a concave function of x with a peak at x( ) where x( ) is the unique solution x to the equation
which is the familiar rule equating the marginal utility from the public good to its marginal taxation cost for individual . It is clear that this peak decreases continuously as moves away from med , both to the left and to the right of med . As the function U (:) is concave in x, we can apply the median voter theorem and assert that there exists a majority equilibrium value of x; which corresponds to the median most-preferred value of x when y = y med . As should be obvious from (8), this decisive individual is not the individual with the median location med , since this individual is the one with the largest willingness to pay for the public good, but rather the individual with the median distance to the median (i.e., the median value of jy med j, since the function (:) is symmetrical around zero). We explain in Appendix 3 how to solve for the median optimal value of x, which we denote by x med .
From the above arguments, we deduce that (x med ; y med ) is the unique ST equilibrium when voting rst over x and then over y. It is also clear that this policy pair is the unique KS equilibrium as well, since y m (x) = y med whatever the value of x. We thus have the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 Given the utility function (7), the policy (x med ; y med ) is the (unique) KramerShepsle equilibrium and it coincides with the Stackelberg equilibrium when people vote rst over
x and then over y.
We now study the Stackelberg equilibrium when we reverse the vote sequence. Given an arbitrary value of y from the rst vote, consider the second stage of the game{ i.e., the vote over
x. Since the utility function (7) is concave in x, we can apply the median voter theorem to learn that the majority chosen x is the median most-preferred value of x given y. The most-preferred value of x of individual given y is
which is symmetrical in around y, and decreasing as moves away from y. Assume without loss of generality that y y med . Two cases can materialize. In the rst one, the decisive voters are the individuals located at a distance from y (to the left or to the right) and such that
i.e., such that exactly 50% of the polity is located at a distance at most equal to from y (and thus prefer a larger value of x than x(y; y )). Note that equation (9) has a solution provided that y { i.e., that y is such that F (2y) 1=2: In words, the majority-chosen value of y must not be too far from the median (too small if we start with y y med as assumed here, or too large if we had rather started with y y med ). If y is far enough from y med , then the decisive voter is the one with the median location, med , with all the voters with < med preferring a larger (resp., lower) value of x than x(y; med ) if y y med (resp., if y > y med ) and all voters with > med preferring a lower (resp. larger) value of x if y y med (resp., if y > y med ).
This shows that the identity of the decisive voter(s) in the second stage changes continuously with the choice made in the rst stage. In terms of policy, this implies that
if y y ;
if y y y ;
where (with an abuse of notation) y is the unique solution to the equation F (2y) = 1=2; y is the unique solution to the equation F (2y 1) = 1=2 and (y) is given by (9). Proposition 6 Given the utility function (7), voting rst over y and then over x, i) in the second stage, the decisive voter type changes continuously with the choice made in the rst stage;
ii) in the rst stage, a voter of type < y (with F (2y ) = 1=2) always votes for a value of y larger than his peak while a voter of type > y (where F (2y 1) = 1=2) always votes for a value of y smaller than his peak . Voters of type y y always vote for a value of y larger (resp., smaller) than their peak if ( ) decreases (resp., increases) with . The sign of the derivative of ( ) with respect to only depends upon the distribution function F .
The intuition for part ii) runs as follows. Individuals know that, if they obtain their \naive" most-preferred location y = in the rst-stage, the majority chosen public good level x will be much lower than their most-favored level, because they will be the ones with the largest willingness to pay for the public good. A small departure from y = then has a secondorder direct cost (because, although less appealing, the location remains close to their rst-best choice) but a rst-order gain, provided that this departure leads to a larger amount of public good in the second stage. A voter whose peak is to the left of y anticipates that a rst-stage choice close to their peak will result in the median voter med being decisive in the second stage. A value of y slightly larger than will then induce a larger second-stage value of x, as it increases the willingness to pay for the public good of the med individual (since it decreases the distance between the rst-stage location choice and his most-preferred location). A similar reasoning explains why individuals located to the right of y always prefer a value of y that is smaller than their rst-best choice . Individuals with intermediate preferences (y y )
anticipate that voters located at a distance (y) from y will be decisive in the second stage. They then bias their rst-stage choice in order to decrease this distance, so that the decisive voter increases his most-preferred public good amount. We show in Appendix 4 that the distance (y) is a function of the distribution function F only.
From Proposition 6 ii), we gather that the rst-stage, most-preferred values of x need not be monotone in (once strategic considerations are taken into account), so that the individual with the median type med need not be the decisive voter. A more precise assessment of the identity of the rst-stage median voter would necessitate the introduction of functional forms for the utility function and for the distribution function F . Observe that, in the special case where F is uniform, the distance (y) is a constant (see Figure 3 ) so that individuals located between 1/4 and 3/4 have no incentive to distort their rst-period choice and vote for y = .
The decisive individual in the rst stage is then med , and the rst-stage choice of location is one half. In that special case, the KS equilibrium is also the ST equilibrium for both voting sequences.
Two-Dimensional Types
In this section, we move to the situation where the type of a voter is two-dimensional. The statistical distribution of types = ( 1 ; 2 ) among the voters is now described by a continuous (i.e. absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on < 2 ) cumulative distribution function F whose support is (a subset of) < 2 ; we denote by f the corresponding density. The utility of a citizen of type for policy (x; y) remains denoted by V ( ; x; y), which is twice continuously di erentiable and concave in (x; y) :
We skip the analysis of the simultaneous voting setting as, in contrast to the one-dimensional case, it is very similar to what is done in theoretical political science (Banks and Austen-Smith (1999) , Ordeshook (1986) ). Instead, we focus on the analysis of the sets of Kramer-Shepsle and Stackelberg equilibria. A new phenomenon appears. In contrast to the one-dimensional type setting where the Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium was unique under some mild monotonicity assumption (see Proposition 3), in the two-dimensional type setting, there may exist several KS equilibria.
Consider the KS equilibrium, and more precisely the vote over y for any given value of
x. Since the utility V is concave with respect to y, the payo of a citizen of type is then maximized for a choice y (x; ) such that
We are able to extend Lemma 1 to the bidimensional type setting, provided that the marginal single crossing assumption introduced in the previous section holds for both dimensions of types.
Assumption 4 (Marginal Single-Crossing (bidimensional types)) We assume that
and for all (x; y) 2 X and 2 < 2 .
Lemma 3 Under Assumption 4, the most-preferred value of x (respectively, of y) is increasing in i , for any given y (resp., of x): @x (y; ) @ i 0 and @y (x; ) @ i 0 for i = 1; 2:
Proof: From the implicit function theorem, we deduce that :
Since V is concave with respect to y, we deduce that the sign of
is the same as the sign of @ 2 V ( ;x;y(x; )) @ i @y
. We proceed similarly to prove that
How do we relate the most-preferred value of y to the bidimensional voter's type? Graphically, we can draw in the two-dimensional space ( 1 ; 2 ) the y isopolicy curves describing, for any given value of y and of x; the one-dimensional set of voters for whom y is the most-preferred policy given x. This curve is described implicitly by the equation :
Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (11) and making use of the marginal single crossing assumption (Assumption 4), we obtain that this curve is decreasing, and that moving in the north-eastern direction leads to larger most-preferred values of y. A typical curve is represented on Figure 4 below.
Insert Figure 4 here.
Making use of (11), we obtain that there exists (at most) one value of 2 such that, for any 1 , x and y, type ( 1 , 2 ) voters most-prefer y when the other dimension is exogenously set at x.
We denote this value of 2 by the function 2 ( 1 ; x; y). Since the utility functions V ( ; x; y) are single-peaked with respect to y for all x and all , we deduce from the median voter theorem that, for any x, there exists a majority voting equilibrium corresponding to the median value of the y isopolicy curve y (x; ). This majority outcome, denoted by y m (x), is the unique solution to the equation
Turning to the choice of x for any given y, we obtain from (11) that there is (at most) one value of 2 such that, for any 1 , x and y, type ( 1 , 2 ) voters most-prefer x when the other dimension is exogenously set at y. We denote this value of 2 by the function 2 ( 1 ; y; x). We deduce similarly that, for any y, there exists a majority voting equilibrium corresponding to the median value of the x isopolicy curve x (y; ). This majority outcome, denoted by x m (y), is the unique solution to the equation
Since the functions x m (y) and y m (x) are continuous and X is convex, we deduce from Brouwer's xed point theorem the existence of a Kramer-Shepsle's equilibrium. We have then proved the following:
Proposition 7 In the bidimensional majority voting setting with a bidimensional type space, under Assumption 4, there always exists at least one KS equilibrium.
The main di erence between Propositions 7 and 3 is twofold. First, we have not proved the unicity of the KS equilibrium when the type space is bidimensional. Second, there is no There is little we can say at this level of generality about the existence or characteristics of the Stackelberg equilibria, and their relationship with the KS equilibria.
12 In order to illustrate our model, we now turn to the framework used most often in the formal political science literature, namely the spatial model where voters are assumed to have quadratic preferences Austen-Smith (1999), Ordeshook (1986) ). This will also allow us to show how multiple KS equilibria can arise.
The utility function of a voter of type ( 1 ; 2 ) is de ned here as follows:
where A In the new space of types, the utility functions are separable and we obtain therefore that there is a unique KS equilibrium which moreover coincides with the Stackelberg equilibrium.
13
Uniqueness follows here from the speci c choice of the two-dimensional type space: a type is the two-dimensional vector of ideal policies. Other parametric speci cations of the type space in the spatial model of politics may display di erent features from the one described above, namely uniqueness 14 and coincidence between KS and Stackelberg. This is illustrated in the following example where the voters are heterogeneous with respect to both the location of their 13 Under some more stringent conditions, like for instance the radial symmetry of the density function f , the KS/Stackelberg equilibrium is also a Condorcet equilibrium when voting simultanesouly over the two policy dimensions. This was observed by Tullock (1967) in the speci c case of a uniform density function. 14 Shepsle (1979) constructs Euclidean patterns leading to a multiplicity of KS equilibria. His examples are straightforward and do not apply here as the set of people admitted to cast a vote varies depending on the policy dimension being considered.
most-preferred policy and the shape of their indi erence curves (i.e., the direction and intensity of the correlation between the two policy dimensions).
Let us consider the case depicted in Figure 5 This example then shows that i) we may have multiple KS equilibria, ii) KS equilibria need not be Stackelberg equilibria and iii) KS equilibria need not correspond to any voter's most-preferred policy. 15 We do not represent level curves for these voters to avoid cluttering the gure further. Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1 i) Since the utility V is concave with respect to x, for any given value of y (resp. x), the payo of a citizen of type is maximized for a choice x (y; ) (resp. y(x; )) such that: @V ( ; x (y; ) ; y) @x = 0 (resp. @V ( ; x; y(x; )) @y = 0).
From the implicit function theorem, we deduce:
From the concavity of V with respect to x and y and Assumption 1, we get:
ii) For any ; the utility function V ( ; x; y) is single-peaked with respect to x and y. Then, from the median voter theorem, we know that for any y (resp. x), there exists a majority equilibrium corresponding to the median value of x(y; ) (resp. y(x; )).
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1
From Assumption 1, we deduce that a necessary condition for the status quo (x ; y ) to be preferred to any other feasible policy bundle by a majority of voters is @V ( med ; x ; y ) @x = 0 and @V ( med ; x ; y ) @y = 0; which implies, if V is further assumed to be strictly concave, that (x ; y ) is the unique ideal point of the median type voter.
Appendix 3: Majority choice of x in section 2.3
The most-preferred value of x decreases from x v 0 1 (
as moves away from med . Without loss of generality, suppose that (y med ) (y med 1).
The proportion B(x) of voters with an ideal peak below the xed level x is given by :
where x is the unique solution to the equation
When F is symmetric, y med = 1 2 , x = x and B is a cumulative distribution function on [x; x] de ned as follows:
Then, the majority choice x med is the unique solution x to the equation :
For instance, when F is uniform, x med is the peak of a voter located at a distance from the median equal to 
Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 6 ii)
The rst-order condition for y of an individual is given by
Our objective is to assess under which circumstances the value of y that maximizes W (y; ) di ers from (which is the \true peak" of the utility function{i.e., the value of y that maximizes V ( ; x; y) for any given value of x). To this e ect, we evaluate the derivative of W (y; ) at y = to obtain @W (y; ) On the other hand, di erentiating @V ( 1 ; 2 ( 1 ; x; y) ; x; y) @y = 0 with respect to x and y leads to @ 2 ( 1 ; x; y) @x = @ 2 V ( 1 ; 2 ( 1 ;x;y);x;y) @y@x @ 2 V ( 1 ; 2 ( 1 ;x;y);x;y) @y@ 2 ;
and @ 2 ( 1 ; x; y) @y = @ 2 V ( 1 ; 2 ( 1 ;x;y);x;y) @ 2 y @ 2 V ( 1 ; 2 ( 1 ;x;y);x;y) @y@ 2 :
We deduce that dy m (x) dx = R +1 1 @ 2 V ( 1 ; 2 ( 1 ;x;ym(x));x;ym(x)) @y@x @ 2 V ( 1 ; 2 ( 1 ;x;ym(x));x;ym(x)) @y@ 2 f ( 1 ; 2 ( 1 ; x; y m (x))) d 1 R +1 1 @ 2 V ( 1 ; 2 ( 1 ;x;ym(x));x;ym(x)) @ 2 y @ 2 V ( 1 ; 2 ( 1 ;x;ym(x));x;ym(x)) @y@ 2 f ( 1 ; 2 ( 1 ; x; y m (x))) d 1 :
Given the concavity of V with respect to y and Assumption 4, the sign of
is the same as the sign of @ 2 V ( 1 ; 2 ;x;y) @y@x , which is non negative by Assumption 3.
The same observations apply of course to the derivative of x m with respect to y.
and therefore, by using (4) again d 2 y m (x) dx 2 = " @ 3 V ( med ;x;ym(x)) @x 2 @y + @ 3 V ( med ;x;ym(x)) @x@y 2 @ 2 V ( med ;x;ym(x)) @x@y @ 2 V ( med ;x;ym(x)) @y 2 # @ 2 V ( med ;x;ym(x)) @y 2 @ 2 V ( med ;x;ym(x)) @y 2 2 " @ 3 V ( med ;x;ym(x)) @x@y 2 + @ 3 V ( med ;x;ym(x)) @y 3 @ 2 V ( med ;x;ym(x)) @x@y @ 2 V ( med ;x;ym(x)) @y 2 # @ 2 V ( med ;x;ym(x)) @x@y @ 2 V ( med ;x;ym(x)) @y 2
2
We then substitute this expression of d 2 y m (x) =dx 2 into (17). As we can see, checking that @ 2 U ( ; x)=@x 2 0 is quite tricky as it involves the sign of many high-order partial derivatives, including third-order cross derivatives. No general principle can be provided and it is necessary to proceed to this computation for each speci c environment.
-Two-dimensional types While the sign of the rst three terms can be deduced from our assumptions, the sign of the last term depends upon more information. The value of the second-order derivative
is obtained by di erentiation of (16) To conclude, it is of course necessary to evaluate ( 1 ; 2 ; x) and ( 1 ; 2 ; x). Using (14), (15) and (16), we can replace 
